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This essay is a response to John Kennedy's defense of Johnson Controls, Inc.'s fetal protection policy which
was struck down last year in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. A unanimous Supreme
Court held in the case that the policy, which excluded women from a "fetotoxic" workplace, violated the
federal employment discrimination laws. The Court's decision was issued only a day before Kennedy was
scheduled to debate the issue of whether Title VII bars fetal protection policies with Professor Elinor
Schroeder at the Kansas Journal's first symposium on March 21-22. 1991. The Court's decision rendered the
technical statutory issues that might otherwise have been discussed at the symposium essentially moot and
freed Kennedy to address, at least in part, some of the more interesting philosophical questions that the
notion of fetal protection suggests. Although to some extent this essay reacts to Kennedy's article previously
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"[T]he way people talk ... is of significance, ... the language i 
I 
they use and the connections they make reveal the world that they i 
see and in which they act."l 
Patriarchy, Paternalism, 
and the Masks 
of "Fetal Protection" 
Kim Dayton 
Patriarchy is the power of the fathers: a familial-
social, ideological, political system in which men-
by force, direct pressure, or through ritual, tradition, 
law and language, customs, etiquette, education, and 
the division of labor, determine what part women 
shall or shall not play, and in which the female is 
everywhere subsumed under the male.2 
This essay is a response to John Kennedy's defense of 
Johnson Controls, Inco's fetal protection policy which was 
struck down last year in Imernational Union, UA W v. Johnson 
COlllro/s. Inc.3 A unanimous Supreme Court held in the case 
that the policy. which excluded women from a "fetotoxic" 
workplace. violated the federal employment discrimination 
laws. The Court's decision was issued only a day before 
Kennedy was scheduled to debate the issue of whether Title 
VII bars fetal protection policies with Professor Elinor 
Schroeder at the Kansas Journal's first symposium on March 
21-22. 1991. The Court's decision renaered the technical 
statutory issues that might otherwise have been discussed at 
the symposium essentially moot and freed Kennedy to 
address. at least in part, some of the more interesting 
philosophical questions that the notion of fetal protection 
suggests. Although to some extent this essay reacts to 
Spring 1992 
Kennedy's article previously published in this Journal;~ it 
results more directly from and responds more explicitly to his 
oral defense of fetal protection policies generally, and the 
language in which that defense was couched. 
I am actually somewhat reluctant even to use the term 
"fetal protection" in this essay. In many ways, the use of such 
words, at least to describe the mandatory policy invalidated in 
Johnson Controls, is but one example of the manner in which 
the patriarchal socio-Iegal structure has successfully 
manipulated language to validate such policies-and their 
historical antecedents-despite their patent discriminatory 
effects on women. For the most part, these policies do not 
protect fetuses. Rather, the policies exclude women from 
certain workplaces because they are deemed capable of 
bearing children. As I discuss below, these policies generally 
apply to the extremely broad category of all women "of 
childbearing age" whether or not an individual woman within 
that category intends to or is likely to carry a fetus while 
working in the toxic environment. The term "fetal protection" 
is thus inaccurate; yet it allows advocates of such policies to 
frame the debate surrounding the underlying issues in terms of 
a conflict between a mother and her fetus. The implicit 
Kim Dayton is a Professor of Law at the University of Kansas. 
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Johnson Controls' hiring personnel were instructed to tell women that : 
the company had no openings for women capable of bearing children. ! 
connotation these two words carry is that a fetus is a person 
needing protection from something-from its mother, as it 
turns out. Though I do not accept the term as accurately 
describing the true nature of these policies, I yield to custom 
to facilitate my discussion. 
Although I do not intend to focus exclusively in this essay 
on the specific policy at issue in Johnson Controls, some 
background on it will provide a context for the broader 
discussion. Johnson Controls' "fetal protection" policy was in 
almost all respects typical. The policy precluded all "fertile" 
women from working in any area of the plant determined to 
be "fetotoxic." Fertile women, as defined by the policy, were 
all women between the ages of five and sixty-three who could 
not prove that they were infertile. In other words, the policy 
presumed a woman's, or girl's, capacity to and interest in 
bearing children. In practice, this meant that if a woman fell 
within the prescribed age range, she had to show that she had 
been surgically sterilized.s The policy defined a "fetotoxic" 
environment as one that, in the estimation of the company's 
medical advisors, created a likelihood of injury to a fetus 
carried in the womb. How likely that injury must be, 
however, was not clear. Interestingly, the environments 
within the plant determined to be fetotoxic were the ones 
where most of the company's highest paying blue collar jobs 
were located~ Moreover, the effect of the policy was to 
exclude women from all industrial jobs at Johnson Controls 
because the policy barred women not just from fetotoxic 
environments per se, but from "any job that might lead to a 
promotion to" a job in a fetotoxic environment.6 Indeed, 
Johnson Controls' hiring personnel were instructed to tell 
women that the company had no openings for women capable 
of bearing children.7 
The effect of Johnson Controls' policy on its female 
employees was real and immediate. One of the named 
plaintiffs in the case was an employee who underwent 
"voluntary" sterilization for economic reasons; she simply 
could not afford to give up the income associated with the 
high-paying jobs from which she would otherwise be 
excluded.s The policy excluded from the fetotoxic workplace 
women whose husbands were sterile, those using effective 
methods of birth control, lesbians, and women who did not 
wish to undergo major surgery to preserve their right to 
work.9 It also forced women who wished to remain in the 
higher paying jobs encompassed by the policy publicly to 
identify themselves as sterile. 
In defending this policy of exclusion, Kennedy raised a 
number of points that seemed extraordinary to me at the time 
and became even more so as I began to learn more about fetal 
protection policies and their history. Among other things, 
Kennedy said that Johnson Controls adopted the mandatory 
policy because women did not respond to a voluntary policy 
which the company had in place from 1977 to 1982. He said 
that in situations involving "conflicts" between maternal 
rights and fetal rights, women are simply incapable of 
understanding the difficult medical and bioethical issues 
raised by fetotoxic environments; or, alternatively, that fertile 
women will be motivated by short-term economic 
considerations (rather, presumably, than by the interests of 
their unborn children) when deciding whether to work in such 
an environment. Finally, he said that the policy was adopted 
on the advice of the company's doctors, not its lawyers-as 
though the involvement of the medical profession a fortiori 
eliminated any possibility of covert discrimination or gender 
bias in the formation and implementation of the policy.IO 
Though many other aspects of Kennedy's argument are 
problematic, it is the above-mentioned claims that I will 
address. For purposes of my discussion, I will assume that ill 
utero lead exposure at the levels involved in the Johnson 
Controls case poses a significant risk to fetuses that does not 
exist for adults exposed to the same environmental lead levels. 
First, consider Kennedy's assertion that women did not 
respond to the company's voluntary policy. In support of this 
claim, he said that "a substantial number" of women became 
pregnant while working in the fetotoxic environment (eight, 
actually), and that one of them had a child who demonstrated 
some characteristics associated with prenatal lead exposure. I I 
At the most pragmatic level, though, the facts belie the claim 
!hat these eight "bad" women to whom Kennedy alludes were 
even in a position to make a rational decision with respect to 
the voluntary policy. Contrary to what Kennedy would like 
us to think, women working at Johnson Controls were not 
privy to the information, statistics, and medical opinion 
concerning prenatal lead exposure that the company provided 
to the Supreme Court of the United States when it was forced 
to justify its policy under Title VIT. As Professor Schroeder 
has so aptly demonstrated,12 the language of the policy was' 
hardly designed to encourage women to remove themselves 
from a high-paying, though fetotoxic, working environment 
because of pregnancy. Johnson Controls' voluntary policy, 
quite simply, did not contain the kind of information a woman 
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would need to make a fully informed choice about the risks 
involved. The policy did not merely minimize the potential 
risks of fetal exposure to high levels of lead in the 
workplace-it implicitly denied that serious risks to fetuses 
existed at Johnson Controls. It characterized the principal risk 
of excessive lead exposure during pregnancy as being 
miscarriage and claimed that the relationship between lead 
exposure and risk to the fetus was less than that of smoking 
and cancer.B 
Thus, the evidence of the eight bad women is all but 
irrelevant to the question of whether well-informed women 
would respond to a voluntary policy. In fact, there is a great 
deal of sociological evidence that women who are fully 
Masks of "Fetal Protection" 
this premise in a moment. But consider first the seemingly 
innocuous claim that a voluntary policy could not be expected 
to be successful because women are not in a position to make 
"the difficult toxicological choice[s]" involved in such a 
decision. This paternalistic claim masks, among other things, 
an implicit assumption that women essentially are not capable 
of deciding complex questions in any reasoned way. 
The notion that women lack the intellectual resources to 
make "rational" decisions in any sphere, is, of course, older 
than history. And it has been espoused overtly more recently 
than one might expect, particularly in connection with matters 
of family and work. The Victorian concept of "separate 
spheres" regarded women as intellectually inferior but 
informed of the risks that particular kinds 
of conduct pose to fetuses they intend to 
carry to term, and who have a choice to 
eliminate those risks, do not engage in the 
problematic conduct. 14 Most of us know 
anecdotally what empirical studies have 
demonstrated: pregnant women are more 
likely to moderate their behavior to protect 
a fetus than to protect themselves.l5 
Moreover, one could just as easily cite the 
dozens or hundreds of women who 
worked in the fetotoxic environment 
during the voluntary policy's tenure and 
did not have children as evidence that in 
fact most women did respond to the 
voluntary policy in the manner that 
Kennedy believes they should have 
responded. That eight women did not 
respond "appropriately" (the eight who 
had children) surely cannot justify 
Obviously, all 
morally superior to men. 16 During the 
nineteenth century, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) mobilized public 
women confronted 
with the policy did 
I support for criminalizing abortion by 
contending that women who had abortions 
simply did not, and could not, understand 
what they were doing.J7 Opponents of 
women's suffrage in the late nineteenth and respond to it. It is 
early twentieth centuries argued that 
women lacked the capacity to make 
reasoned judgments concerning the 
political process and hence should not be 
permitted to vote.l8 This belief in women's 
just that some of i 
! them did not respond: 
in the manner which 
Kennedy deemed 
limited intellectual capacity is, 
unfortunately, still popular in some circles. 
Even today, one theme of the right to life 
movement is that women who have 
abortions do not understand that they are 
killing their babies. 19 
appropriate. 
penalizing all women-whether or not they planned to have 
children-in the sweeping manner envisioned by the 
mandatory policy ultimately adopted by Johnson Controls. 
Kennedy's argument concerning the need for a mandatory 
policy is related to his second argument: that women are 
incapable of evaluating the evidence, balancing the risks and 
benet its of working in the fetotoxic environment, and making 
the proper choice to protect the fetus. Obviously, all women 
confronted with the policy did respond to it. It is just that 
some of them did not respond in the manner which Kennedy 
deemed appropriate. In arguing that the voluntary policy 
obviously failed because eight women conceived despite the 
dangers of lead exposure to their fetuses, Kennedy implicitly 
suggested that any rational woman would choose to take a pay 
cut rather than endanger a fetus. It is certainly not clear that 
the alleged conflict between possibly endangering a fetus and, 
for example. failing to meet the economic needs of existing 
children, must be resolved in favor of the fetus. I wiII turn to 
Spring 1992 
Admittedly, Kennedy did not ever say 
explicitly that women are intellectually inferior to men. In 
arguing that a mandatory policy was necessary, Kennedy 
spoke in terms of "employees," not "women.''20 His claim, 
however, that a mandatory policy was necessary to protect 
them and the unborn from the consequences of their own 
foolishness may well have been the product of such an 
unconscious belief. In fact, fetal protection policies are just 
one facet of the tradition of "protectionist" legislation which 
developed from such premises.21 It requires no great 
interpretive leaps to see this belief in women's irrationality in 
Kennedy's defense of Johnson Controls' actions. Injustifying 
a mandatory policy on the ground of women's inability to 
make rational choices on their own, Kennedy revealed, 
perhaps unwittingly, the continued influence of such views 
upon the formation of corporate and public policy. 
Suppose, however, that my interpretation of Kennedy's 
language is too radical. One need not concede my point here 
to find troublesome value judgments implicit in Johnson 
iii 
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I 
The theoretical woman who is fully informed of the dangers of lead I 
exposure to a fetus, yet chooses to stay on in a fetotoxic environment, 
may well be motivated not by disregard for the fetus, but by concern 
for existing children or other family obligations. 
Controls' effort to exclude all women from the fetotoxic 
environment. According to Kennedy, a mandatory policy of 
exclusion was necessary to ensure that women made the 
rational and correct decision to sacrifice present income to 
protect future children from some unquantified risk of 
childhood developmental problems.22 This assessment, of 
course, works only if one concludes that in fact this is the only 
rational or defensible choice for a person confronted with 
these two alternatives. Yet Kennedy did not feel the need to 
explain why this choice was obvious-much less why 
employers are justified as a moral matter in giving women 
only those two alternatives. 
As I have suggested previously, deciding between the 
needs of the fetus and the needs of the individual and her 
family is not as simple as Kennedy would have us believe. 
The theoretical woman who is informed fully of the dangers 
of lead exposure to a fetus, yet chooses to stay on in a 
fetotoxic environment, may well be motivated not by 
disregard for the fetus, but by concern for existing children or 
other family obligations.23 Though Kennedy would like to 
cast such a woman's decision to stay as morally bankrupt, I 
would argue that it is the policymaker who forces her to make 
that decision whose values and judgments should be 
questioned. 
By framing the fetal protection issue as one of conflicting 
rightS-between the mother and the fetus-advocates of the 
concept of fetal protection successfully have created an 
analytical framework that invites a resolution of the alleged 
conflict in favor of fetal protection, even if that means 
denying the mother job opportunities or even her freedom.24 
The conflict seems more difficult to resolve in the mother's 
favor than the "conflict" raised by the abortion issue: one 
need not be "pro-life" with respect to the question of abortion 
to agree that a woman ought to take measures to protect the 
integrity of a fetus she intends to carry to term. Indeed, when 
I first began to consider the problem of "maternal rights 
versus fetal rights," I had little difficulty rationalizing the 
concept of true fetal protection.25 I consider myself a 
humanitarian, and it is intuitively difficult to justify social 
policy that permits one person to jeopardize the lifelong well-
being of another for the sake of, as Kennedy put it, "short-
EI 
term economic needs." 
One problem with this mode of reasoning, however, is that 
the architects of fetal protection policies imply that there is 
but a single solution to this conflict. That solution, to exclude 
the woman from the workplace, depends on denying 
completely the woman her rights in order to protect the needs 
of the fetus. But this is not the only way in which the alleged 
conflict can be resolved. In fact, it is not the way the conflict 
has been resolved in any but a small group of workplace 
scenarios. As a number of feminist scholars have observed, 
fetal protection policies exist only in industries where women 
might be deemed "expendable"-that is, in industries either 
where women do not make up a significant portion of the 
workforce, or from which, historically, they have been 
excluded because of overt gender discrimination. Many, 
perhaps even most, workplace environments that employ 
women on a large scale create risks of harm to the fetus that 
are at least as serious as, for example, lead exposure at the 
levels involved at Johnson Controls.26 Nevertheless, fetal 
protection policies do not exist in such industries because they 
could not function without women; society's concern for a 
smoothly running economy evidently outweighs its concern 
for the millions of young lives potentially affected by these 
workplace hazards. When viewed against this backdrop, fetal 
protection policies seem to be less about fetal protection and 
more about keeping historically male-dominated workplaces 
male dominated. 
Equally important, where conflicts between paternal and 
fetal rights arise, they have inevitably been resolved in favor 
of paternal rights. A typical response to this observation is 
that the connection between male exposure to environmental 
toxins (or of male ingestion of cocaine, or a father's smoking) 
and fetal damage is "less clear" or "less well-established" than 
that between maternal exposure and fetal damage. Even 
assuming that this is true with respect to many kinds of 
workplace hazards (an assumption that is becoming 
increasingly suspect),27 the fact is that there do not appear to 
be any examples of fetal protection policies aimed at or which 
operate to exclude men. Men simply are not precluded from 
working in environments that, for example, threaten the 
integrity of their sperm, and hence of the children that they 
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 
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might someday father. In other words, employers, and 
ultimately society, are concerned about fetal protection only 
when the rights being subordinated to the fetus's are those of 
the mother. 
Kennedy's emphasis on the company medical department's 
role in formulating its fetal protection policy is interesting. 
His declaration that the mandatory policy imposed in 1982 
was adopted "at the urging of the company's doctors, not the 
company lawyers"28 appears intended to assure us that the 
policy was a reflection not of corporate greed or intentional 
sex discrimination, but of pure humanitarian concern. 
Unfortunately, this argument loses its allure when we are 
reminded that the male-dominated medical 
Masks of "Fetal Protection" 
medical personnel did not recommend making the workplace 
safe for fetuses than simply to know that Johnson Controls' 
policy was the product of medical, rather than legal, opinion. 
In criticizing Kennedy's paternalism, am I suggesting that we 
should not seek solutions to the reality that maternal exposure 
to environmental toxins may threaten the future health and 
development of an unborn fetus? Of course not. Yet, from 
the perspective of many feminists, the solution to this problem 
is really quite simple. Construct the job ~nd the workplace as 
though women matter. Consider the issue in light of its 
historical context. Reject the view that the fetotoxic 
workplace raises a problem of conflicting "rights," and 
profession has never been particularly 
concerned with the interests and needs of 
women. The AMA's involvement in the 
nineteenth century anti-abortion movement 
[E]mployers, and 
conceive of the problem as one of the 
limits of responsibility-including the 
limits of employer responsibility to the 
fetus that it ostensibly views as so 
important. Such an approach assuredly 
implies that an employer should not 
remove all potential mothers from the 
workplace, but rather, should make the 
workplace safe for the potential fetus. 
Kennedy appears to contend that this was 
not possible at Johnson Controls, but the 
fact is that any workplace can always be 
made safer, and usually safe enough for a 
fetus. The problem is that the cost of 
taking measures to ensure such safety may 
be more than the employer would like to 
pay. It is far easier-and historically it has 
ultimately society, 
is exemplary of the profession's role in the 
debate over women's rights versus the 
interests of family, children, and society. 
Feminists have repeatedly documented the 
health care industry'S "brutal indifference 
toward women. "29 In recent years, we 
have learned that medical researchers 
almost universally have excluded women ' 
as subjects in their research, and that they 
have failed to devote the same attention to 
diseases that affect primarily women as to 
those which affect primarily men. 
Recently, a number of hospitals have gone 
are concerned about 
fetal protection only 
when the rights 
being subordinated 
to the fetus's are 
those of the mother. 
to court to protect the "rights" of a fetus 
vis-a-vis its mother, almost inevitably taking legal positions 
that call for complete subordination of the mothers' interests 
to those of the fetus.3o Indeed, some physicians have gone so 
far as to encourage and assist in the criminal prosecution of 
women whose conduct is perceived to endanger their unborn 
children. 
The fact that Kennedy did not know this misogynic side of 
the medical profession-that he is able to use the medical 
argument at all-is indicative of the impoverished 
understanding that policymakers generally have of women's 
historic oppression. It is extremely unlikely that the medical 
"advisors" \vho ostensibly recommended this policy were at 
all concerned with the needs and interests of women. In view 
of this, their recommendations concerning corporate policy 
formation are arguably implicitly suspect. It is more 
important to me that Kennedy explain why the company's 
Spring 1992 
been perfectly acceptable-to allow 
women to bear the economic costs of 
societal ills than to allocate that cost more equally among all 
members of society. 
As I began to appreciate the historical and sociological 
underpinnings of fetal protection policies, in all their guises, it 
became clear to me that these policies cannot be understood 
simply as a neutral solution to a thorny conflict between 
maternal and fetal rights. They are, instead, yet another 
reflection of an historic pattern that has denied women the 
right to work in particular employment contexts. Masked in 
language that conceals this history, fetal protection policies 
are intuitively justifiable and hence appear just. If society is 
truly concerned about the rights of fetuses as persons or future 
persons, it must be willing to devise social and economic 
policies that will ensure that protection of those rights does 
not come exclusively at the expense of the women who carry 
them. 
• 
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obligations. Kennedy suggests that a woman who stays in a fetotoxic 
environment in these circumstances is succumbing to "short-term 
economic needs." See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 141. An alternative 
explanation is that she is weighing the interests of a potential person 
who might potentially be injured if she stays against the interests of 
existing persons who would in fact be injured if she leaves, and 
rationally deciding in favor of existing persons. 
15. E.g., Rosett et aI. supra note 14, at 2031 (showing that heavy 
drinkers modify alcohol consumption during pregnancy); Williamson 
et aI.. supra note 14. at 70-74 (pregnant women are more likely to 
quite smoking than nonpregnant women). 
My citation to these studies should not be interpreted to mean that 
I believe a woman ought ever to have to choose between her right to 
a higher wage and the interests of a fetus that she intends to carry to 
term. Simply because most women in this position will choose to 
protect the fetus does not mean that societal conditions that make this 
choice necessary are acceptable. See generally CATHERINE A. 
MACKINNON. TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 
(1989). 
16. For discussions of Victorian notions of the "separate spheres" 
of women and men, see, e.g., JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND 
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 119 (1991); 1 WOMEN 
IN AMERICAN LAW 140 (Marlene S. Wortman ed., 1985). 
17. See KRISTIN LUKER. ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF 
MOTHERHOOD 21 (1984). 
(Why should nineteenth-century physicians have become so 
involved with the question of abortion? The physicians 
themselves gave two related explanations for their 
activities, and these explanations have been taken at face 
value ever since. First. they argued, they were compelled 
to address the abortion question because American women 
were committing a moral crime based on ignorance about 
the proper value of embryonic life ... Second, they argued, 
they were obliged to act in order to save women from their 
own ignorance because only physicians were in possession 
of new scientific evidence which demonstrated beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that the embryo was a child from 
conception onward.). 
[d.; See gellerally id. at 20-341. 
18. See, e.g., AILEEN S. KRADITOR. THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN 
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT. 1890-1920, at 14-42 (1965); Catherine A. 
MacKinnon. Reflectiolls Oil Sex Equality Under Law. 100 YALE LJ. 
1281. 1283 n.12 (1991); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and SUffrage in 
the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REv. 335, 357 (1989); see 
also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) ("[T]he civil law, 
as well as nature herself. has always recognized a wide difference in 
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or 
should be woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper 
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timidity and delicacy of the female sex evidently unfits it for many of 
the occupations of civil life."). 
19. This is the premise of the notorious anti-abortion film "The 
Silent Scream." 
20. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 141 ("The employee is the least 
informed and the least capable of making a difficult toxicological 
choice .... Furthermore, the employee's decision may be influenced 
by short-term economic needs.") (emphasis added). 
21. See generally Becker, supra note 4, at 1221-25 (discussing 
history of protective legislation affecting women's right to work); 
Ellen Bigge, Comment, The Fetal Rights Colltroversy: A 
ReSUrfacing of Sex Discrimination in the Guise of Fetal Protection, 
57 UMKC L. REv. 261 (1989). 
22. According to Johnson Controls' voluntary policy, the principal 
risk of prenatal lead exposure is miscarriage. It would seem that 
perhaps Kennedy is just as concerned about this risk to fetuses as the 
developmental problems that are thought to occur in some children 
exposed to lead in utero. Emphasizing this aspect of prenatal lead 
exposure, however, has certain pro-life moral overtones. Overtones 
that Kennedy no doubt did not have an interest in discussing as a 
justification for Johnson Controls' fetal protection pOlicy. 
23. See UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th 
Cir. 1989 (en banc) (Cudahy, 1., dissenting), rev'd III S. Ct. 1196 
(1991). ("What is the situation of the pregnant woman, unemployed 
or working for the minimum wage and unprotected by health 
insurance, in relation to her pregnant sister, exposed to an 
indeterminate lead risk but well-fed, housed and doctored? Whose 
fetus is at greater risk? Whose decision is this to make?") (emphasis 
added). 
24. Cj. Note, Rethinking (M}otherhood: Feminist Theory and 
State Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1335 
(1990) ("Rights discourse transforms problems in a way that makes 
them subject to legal solution . . . . some feminists have suggested 
that the language of rights is problematic in that it inadequately 
describes women's experience while masking issues of power."). 
25. Cj. Becker, supra note 4, at 1220 ("At first glance, most 
people presented with this issue (myself included) assume that 
'reasonable' restrictions on maternal employment must be 
appropriate in some circumstances for the protection of fetuses."). 
By true fetal protection, I am thinking of protective measures 
narrowly designed to protect an actual fetus who can be expected to 
be carried to term. Johnson Controls' policy, as noted, went far 
beyond this in its exclusion of all women from the workplace, 
irrespective of whether they were or intended to become pregnant. 
Most fetal protection policies are overbroad in this sense, and thus 
misnamed. In another sense, of course, fetal protection measures are 
seldom broad enough, in that they never evolve in environments in 
which women are deemed indispensable. 
26. See Schroeder, supra note 4, at 147; Becker, supra note 4, at 
1237-40 (list examples of other "fetotoxic" workplaces). It is worth 
mentioning that in 1981 the EEOC withdrew a proposed fetal 
protection guideline after it was determined that over 20 million 
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women worked in jobs that posed risks to fetuses. See Interpretive 
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive 
Hazards, 45 Fed. Reg. 7514 (1980) (to be codified at 41 C.F.R. 60-
20) (proposed Feb. I, 1980) (articulating guideline); Interpretive 
Guidelines on Employment Discrimination and Reproductive 
Hazards; Withdrawel of Proposed Guidelines 46 Fed. Reg. 3916 
(1981) (proposed Jan. 16, 1981) (withdrawing guideline). 
27. Until relatively recently, it was not particularly fashionable to 
research the relationship between male conduct and fetal damage. 
Recently, however, it has become clear through a number of studies 
that many kinds of paternal conduct can have tetragenic effects on 
offspring. See generally Mary C. Lowry, et aI., Male-Mediated 
Behavioral Abnormalities, MurATION REsEARCH, Apr. 1990, at 213-
29; David A. Savitz, et aI., Influence of Paternal Age, Smoking, and 
Alcohol Consumption on Congential Abnormalities, TETRALOGY, 
Oct. 1991, at 429-40; Ricardo A. Yazigi, et aI., Demonstration of 
Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 JAMA 
1956 Oct. 9, 1991; Vitamin C Deficiency in a Man's Diet Might 
Cause Problems for Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1992, at C12 
(study reported in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
showed direct relationship between a male's diet low in Vitamin C 
and increased DNA damage in sperm cells); Dwight E.M. Angell, 
Sperm Damage Linked to Birth Defects, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, 
Dec. 31, 1991, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Medline File.; Protecting 
Unborn, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1991, at 4D; Jane Brody, Personal 
Health, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1991, at 64. In fact, the record in 
Johnson Controls itself indicates that lead exposure at the levels 
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918-19 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd 
III S. Ct. 1196 (1991). 
28. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 142. 
29. RICH, supra note 2, at x. 
30. See generally Cole, supra note 14, at 2664. 
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